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We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals
and interdependent valuations. When agents’ signals are statistically independent,
Jehiel and Moldovanu [Efficient design with interdependent valuations, Economet-
rica, 69(5):1237-1259, 2001] show that efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanisms generally do not exist. In this paper, we extend the standard model
to accommodate maxmin agents and obtain necessary as well as sufficient con-
ditions under which efficient allocations can be implemented. In particular, we
derive a condition that quantifies the amount of ambiguity necessary for efficient
implementation. We further show that under some natural assumptions on the
preferences, this necessary amount of ambiguity becomes sufficient. Finally, we
provide a definition of informational size such that given any nontrivial amount
of ambiguity, efficient allocations can be implemented if agents are sufficiently in-
formationally small.
Keywords: Efficient implementation, ambiguity aversion, multidimensional
signal, interdependent valuation.
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One of the fundamental problems in mechanism design is the conflict between
efficiency and incentive compatibility. That is, there are situations in which effi-
cient allocations are not implementable. A prominent impossibility result is ob-
tained by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001): in a general mechanism design setting
with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations, if signals are statis-
tically independent, then except in some special, nongeneric cases, ex post efficient
and interim incentive compatible mechanisms do not exist.1 This result is obtained
under the standard assumption that agents are expected utility maximizers. How-
ever, there is both experimental and empirical evidence challenging the expected
utility assumption: due to lack of knowledge about the environment, agents may
perceive ambiguity, that is, they might not have a unique prior that fully describes
the uncertainty that they face, and moreover, agents desire strategies that are ro-
bust to their ambiguity.2 Thus, the primary question we ask is: does the conflict
between efficiency and incentive compatibility extend to environments with am-
biguity averse agents? In the case of maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989)), our answer is: No. That is, we show that the presence of ambiguity
aversion overturns the impossibility result of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). In par-
ticular, we extend the Myersonian approach to a single object allocation problem
with maxmin agents and explicitly identify necessary and sufficient conditions for
efficient implementation. In addition, we provide conditions under which the effi-
cient allocation is implementable with a small amount of ambiguity.
Our first step is to derive a necessary condition for an allocation rule to be im-
plementable which generalizes the envelope formula familiar from Bayesian mech-
1Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) generalize earlier results by Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin
(2000).
2Experimental results on the Ellsberg paradox reveal that agents exhibit ambiguity averse behavior
in many situations (e.g., Ellsberg (1961), Halevy (2007)). Aryal et al. (2018) find empirical evidence
of ambiguity in U.S. timber auctions.
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anism design. This condition quantifies a nontrivial amount of ambiguity, which
we call Minimal Ambiguity, that is necessary for efficient and incentive compatible
mechanisms to exist. That some ambiguity is necessary is consistent with the im-
possibility result obtained by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) in the sense that with-
out ambiguity the requirements of efficiency and incentive compatibility become
incompatible.
Our next step is to identify conditions under which this necessary amount of
ambiguity is sufficient for efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms to exist.
A key observation is that if Minimal Ambiguity is satisfied, we can construct effi-
cient mechanisms that satisfy local incentive compatibility constraints. Thus, our
question becomes: under what conditions does local incentive compatibility imply
global incentive compatibility? In Bayesian settings, Myerson (1981) showed that
under a monotonicity condition, global incentive compatibility constraints can be
obtained from adding up a sequence of local incentive compatibility constraints.
To extend the classic Myersonian approach to environments with maxmin agents,
we need to address two issues. The first is to identify the monotonicity condition
in our setting. The other is to deal with the nonadditivity of the maxmin represen-
tation: the belief used in each constraint is endogenously determined and, hence,
the sum of these local constraints can differ from the global one. Regarding the
first issue, the desired monotonicity condition turns out to be a multidimensional
extension of the familiar single-crossing condition from one-dimensional settings.3
Regarding the second issue, if each agent’s valuation function is linear in his own
signal, such nonadditivity does not arise. Otherwise, the linearity condition on val-
uation functions can be replaced by two other restrictions on preferences: agents’
valuation functions satisfy a familiar increasing differences condition and agents’
preferences satisfy the comonotonic independence axiom of Schmeidler (1989).
Another contribution of the paper is to identify conditions under which the
3See Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), and Bergemann and Välimäki
(2002).
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amount of ambiguity sufficient for efficient implementation can be arbitrarily small.
Specifically, we link the required size of ambiguity perceived by an agent to his in-
formational size, a notion studied by McLean and Postlewaite (2002, 2004, 2015a,b).
Intuitively, an agent is informationally small if his private information has a small
marginal effect on other agents’ valuations. We show that given any nontrivial
amount of ambiguity, efficient allocations can be implemented if agents are suf-
ficiently informationally small. One instance in which informational smallness
arises naturally is when the number of agents is large. As a result, efficient and
incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a large economy even when each agent
perceives only a small amount of ambiguity. An immediate consequence of this
result is that complete ambiguity is generally not necessary for implementing effi-
cient allocations when agents have quasilinear utilities.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the general model.
In Sections 3 and 4, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an allocation
rule to be implementable. We then apply these results to the implementation of the
efficient allocation rule in Section 5. In Section 5.1, we present results on informa-
tional smallness. In Section 6, we present a simple example to illustrate the main
insight for our results. We conclude with discussion and related literature in the
final section.
2 The Model
Information structure. Suppose that there is a single object to be allocated
among N agents, indexed by i ∈ I := {1, ..., N}. We assume that agent i observes
a signal (or type) si = (si1, ..., s
i
N) drawn from a space S
i ⊆ RN. The coordinate sij
represents agent i’s one-dimensional piece of information affecting agent j’s valua-
4Complete ambiguity means each agent’s set of beliefs contains all probability measures over the
other agents’ signals.
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tion for the object.5 This information structure is used by many models that appear
in the literature on mechanism design with multidimensional signals, including Je-
hiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel et al. (1996).
We assume that each agent i’s signal space Si is compact and convex, and that it
has a nonempty interior and a piecewise smooth boundary. We further assume that
each Si is a sublattice in RN according to the usual product order. Let S := ×Ni=1S
i
with s as generic element and let S−i := ×j 6=iS
j with s−i as generic element. For
every i, j ∈ I , let Sij := {s
i
j|s
i ∈ Si} and S−ij := ×l 6=iS
l
j.
Given the information structure defined above, agent i’s valuation for the ob-
ject is given by vi(s1i , ..., s
N
i ) ∈ R+. We assume that each v
















is equicontinuous at every sii.
Observe that given s−ii ∈ S
−i
i , v





agent i is indifferent among all signals whose ith components are equal to sii. This
leads to the following notation:
e(sii) := {t






i, ∀i ∈ I .
Notice that the set e(sii) is a singleton in two special cases: the case of private valu-
ations and the case of one-dimensional signals.
Mechanisms. An allocation rule is a function p : S → RN such that for every
s ∈ S, 0 ≤ pi(s) ≤ 1 and for every s ∈ S, ∑Ni=1 p
i(s) = 1. For reported signals s, the
term pi(s) is the probability that agent i is awarded the object. An allocation rule p
is efficient if
pi(s) > 0 ⇒ i ∈ argmax
j
vj(s1j , ..., s
N
j ) ∀s ∈ S.
A transfer scheme is a function x : S → RN, where xi(s) represents the transfer
to agent i given the reports s. A direct mechanism is a pair (p, x) where p is an
5The essential assumption is sii, the part of agent i’s information affecting his own valuation, is
one-dimensional. All of our results extend to environments where sij is multidimensional for j 6= i.
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allocation rule and x is a transfer scheme. A direct mechanism is efficient if the
associated allocation rule is efficient.
Interim utilities. Let Σ−i be the Borel algebra on S−i and F i be a set of proba-
bility measures on (S−i, Σ−i). This set represents agent i’s beliefs about the other
agents’ signals. A key assumption here is agent i’s set of beliefs F i is independent
of the realization of his signal.6 We assume that F i is weak∗ compact and convex.
We assume that agents have quasilinear preferences. Given a direct mechanism
(p, x), agent i’s interim utility from reporting ti when his signal is si and everyone
else reports truthfully is











The function µi : Si → R defined by µi(si) := ui(si, si), is called agent i’s indirect
utility function associated with (p, x). Notice that when an agent is not awarded
the object and receives zero transfer, his utility is normalized to be zero.
Environment. An environment is a tuple 〈I , {vi}Ni=1, {S
i}Ni=1, {F
i}Ni=1〉. We as-
sume that the environment is common knowledge, but the realizations of the sig-
nals are private information.7
Next we define completeness of sets of signals under an allocation rule.
Definition 1. The collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete under the allocation rule p if for
every i ∈ I and every sii ∈ S
i


































∀ti ∈ e(sii), ∀s
−i ∈ S−i.
In words, the collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete under an allocation rule p if within
each e(sii), there exist a “best” signal and a “worst” signal that generate respec-
tively the highest and the lowest probability of obtaining the object, regardless of
6A discussion about what would happen if an agent’s set of beliefs can depend on the realization
of his signal is given in Section 7.
7A discussion about relaxing the assumption that the sets F i are common knowledge is given in
Section 7.
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the signals of the others. To simplify the analysis, throughout this paper we will
focus on allocation rules under which the collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete. Clearly,
the collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete under any allocation rule in the case of private
valuations and the case of one-dimensional signals, as the set e(sii) is a singleton
in those two cases. In general, the collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete under monotonic
allocation rules, in the sense that keeping agent i’s valuation fixed while increasing
the valuations of other agents will not increase agent i’s probability of obtaining
the object. For example, we show in Section 5 that the collection {Si}Ni=1 is com-
plete under the efficient allocation rule.8
3 Interim Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
We first derive a first-order condition which quantifies a necessary amount of
ambiguity for an allocation rule to be implementable. In Section 3.2, we present
conditions under which the first-order condition is sufficient for implementability.
By the revelation principle, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to incentive compatible direct mechanisms. A direct mechanism (p, x) is interim
incentive compatible if
µi(si) = ui(si, si) ≥ ui(ti, si) ∀si, ti ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ I .9
An allocation rule p is implementable if there exists a transfer scheme x such that
the direct mechanism (p, x) is interim incentive compatible.
8More generally, the collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete under an allocation rule p if for every i ∈ I
and every sii ∈ S
i
i, there exists a continuous function α : ×j 6=iS
i
j → R










−i) := pi(si, s−i) is monotone in α for every s−i ∈ S−i. The efficient
allocation rule corresponds to the case in which K = N − 1 and α is the identity function for all
i ∈ I and sii ∈ S
i
i. A trivial example is when the allocation rule p depends on s
i only through sii.
Another example is when agent i’s probability of obtaining the object increases in his externality,






N) = maxj 6=i s
i
j (e.g., the agent with the
largest externality is awarded the object, that is, pi(s) > 0 ⇒ maxj 6=i s
i
j ≥ maxk 6=l s
k
l ).
9Observe that the definition of interim incentive compatibility only invokes pure strategies. This
is without loss of generality if either of the following assumptions holds: (i) agents cannot reduce
ambiguity by randomizing ex ante; (ii) agents cannot commit to the results of their randomizations.
For a more detailed discussion about these assumptions see Saito (2015) and Ke and Zhang (2017).
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3.1 First-order Condition
We start by deriving a necessary condition for a mechanism to be interim incen-
tive compatible, which generalizes the envelope formula familiar from Bayesian
mechanism design. Recall that in a Bayesian environment, the envelope formula
yields an expression for the derivative of an agent’s equilibrium utility with re-
spect to his signal in any interim incentive compatible mechanism (e.g., Theorem
3.1 in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001)). However, when agents are ambiguity averse,
the envelope theorem may fail due to the nondifferentiability of the interim utility
functions.10 Instead, we establish lower and upper bounds for the derivative of an
agent’s equilibrium utility.
Lemma 3.1. If p is implementable, then for every i ∈ I , the associated indirect utility
function µi is a Lipschitz continuous function of sii; its derivative is defined almost every-





























One implication of Lemma 3.1 is that an agent’s equilibrium utility associated
with a given allocation rule may not be uniquely determined up to a constant.
Thus, the payoff equivalence result may fail in the presence of ambiguity aver-
sion.11 However, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that the range of indirect utilities is
determined by the allocation rule.
Another immediate implication of Lemma 3.1 is that a minimum requirement
on the sets of beliefs must be imposed in order for the allocation rule p to be im-
plementable. We now define the key concept of the paper—Minimal Ambiguity.
Definition 2. The collection {F i}Ni=1 satisfies Minimal Ambiguity under the allo-
10It is well known that maxmin preferences have “kinks at certainty”. See, for example, Dow and
Werlang (1992).
11This point has already been noted by Bodoh-Creed (2012) and Wolitzky (2016). Carbajal and Ely
(2013) state a similar result in a more general mechanism design setting.
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Since the inequality in (1) is necessary for implementation, it is easily seen that
when agents are Bayesian, an allocation rule p is implementable only if p depends
on si only through sii. For example, this is the case when valuations are private
or when signals are one-dimensional. However, agent i’s information sij for j 6= i
generally affects his probability of being awarded the object. Consequently, Min-
imal Ambiguity is violated when agents are Bayesian. For example, the signals
sij for j 6= i are clearly relevant to determining the efficient allocation. Thus,
given the efficient allocation rule p, there exist sii ∈ S
i
i and s











. As a result, a nontrivial amount of ambiguity is
necessary for Minimal Ambiguity to hold and, hence, for the efficient allocation
rule p to be implementable.
To see explicitly how the inequality in (1) quantifies a minimal amount of am-
biguity for implementation, we consider two particular specifications of sets of
priors that offer scalar parametrizations of ambiguity aversion and that are com-
monly used in the literature on robust Bayesian analysis.
Example 1. [ε-contamination12] We refer to ε-contamination if agent i’s set of be-
liefs F i is given by
Cε(F
i




where Fi∗ ∈ ∆(S
−i) and ε ∈ [0, 1].13 Intuitively, agent i puts a weight of 1 − ε on
the other agents’ signals being drawn from the distribution Fi∗, but puts ε weight
that the signals could be drawn from any other distribution. Thus, 1 − ε can be
interpreted as the agent’s “degree of confidence” in the belief Fi∗. The larger ε is,
12The axiomatic foundation for the ε-contamination model is provided by Kopylov (2016). Bose
et al. (2006) and Bose and Daripa (2009) adopt this formulation to study the problem of optimal
auction design.
13For any measurable space (Ω, Σ), let ∆(Ω) denote the set of all probability measures on (Ω, Σ).
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independent of s−ii for every i ∈ I . Then when agents’ preferences are represented



































i, ∀i ∈ I .
























−i) = 0, then Minimal Ambiguity is satisfied for all ε ≥ 0; otherwise,
Minimal Ambiguity establishes a positive lower bound on ε for implementing the
allocation rule p.
Example 2. In the second specification, agent i’s set of beliefs F i is an entropy-
constrained ball. Fix a focal belief Fi∗ ∈ ∆(S
−i) for every i ∈ I . For any belief
Gi ∈ ∆(S−i), its relative entropy is R(Gi ‖ Fi∗) ∈ [0, ∞], where







if Gi is absolutely continuous with respect to Fi∗ and ∞ otherwise. Though R(G
i ‖
Fi∗) is not a metric, it is a measure of the distance between G
i and Fi∗. In particular,
R(Gi ‖ Fi∗) = 0 if and only if G
i = Fi∗. Let each agent i’s set of beliefs be
F i = {Gi ∈ ∆(S−i)|R(Gi ‖ Fi∗) ≤ λ}
for some λ ≥ 0. Similarly, if p depends on si only through sii, then Minimal Am-
biguity is satisfied for all λ ≥ 0. When λ = ∞, F i = ∆(S−i) for all i and Minimal
Ambiguity is always satisfied. In general, there exists a threshold λ ≥ 0 such that
Minimal Ambiguity is satisfied if and only if λ ≥ λ.
14Following Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), we say that the agent with the set of priors F is more
ambiguity averse than the agent with the set of priors F ′ if F ⊇ F ′.
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3.2 When is the First-order Condition Sufficient?
As in the standard Myersonian approach to Bayesian mechanism design prob-
lems, we first construct mechanisms that satisfy the first-order condition given by
Lemma 3.1. Intuitively, this first-order condition can be interpreted as local incen-
tive compatibility. In a Bayesian environment, a monotonicity condition is then
used to ensure that local incentive compatibility implies global incentive compati-
bility. However, with maxmin agents, monotonicity alone may no longer suffice to
establish the sufficiency of local incentive compatibility. To tackle this problem, we
establish a technical condition under which the Myersonian first-order approach
applies in our setting. We want to emphasize that the main goal of this paper
is to identify natural conditions on primitives of the model so that this technical
condition is satisfied, and this is addressed in Section 4.
3.2.1 Monotonicity
We start with the definition of monotonicity in our setting. Recall first that
for every i ∈ I and every sii ∈ S
i


































∀ti ∈ e(sii), ∀s
−i ∈ S−i.
































Under the efficient allocation rule, Monotonicity becomes a multidimensional
version of the single-crossing condition familiar from one-dimensional settings.
To see this, recall that the efficient allocation rule requires that agent i should be
awarded the object when vi(sii, s
−i
i ) > v
j(sij, s
−i
j ) for every j 6= i. Thus, a sufficient
11

































at any point where vi(sii, s
−i
i ) = v
j(sij, s
−i























increase in sii depends both on how responsive agent j’s valuation is to agent i’s sig-
nal and on the shape of agent i’s signal space Si. In a setting in which signals are
one-dimensional, only the former matters and condition (2) reduces to the stan-
dard single-crossing condition, which says that one agent’s signal has a greater
marginal effect on his own valuation than on that of any other agent; in a setting
in which signals are multidimensional, the shape of the signal space also plays
an important role. Therefore, Monotonicity imposes joint restrictions on valuation
functions and signal spaces.
Two examples are provided below to help in understanding when condition (2)
is satisfied and, consequently, Monotonicity is satisfied by the efficient allocation
rule.
Example 3. Suppose that sii and s
i
j are independently distributed for all i ∈ I and





> 0, we have sij(s
i






i) = max S
i
j for all















> 0, condition (2)
is always satisfied.
Example 4. We now present an example with a simple information structure in
which each agent’s signal can be decomposed into a “private” and a “common”
element.16 Each agent i has a signal (θi, ci) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], where θi and ci are
15Our general model allows for correlation between sii and s
i
j for j 6= i, as is shown in Example 4.
16Similar examples have been discussed by Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001), and Compte and Jehiel (2002).
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independently distributed. Agent i’s valuation for the object is given by
vi = θi + aci + b ∑
j 6=i
cj ∀θi ∈ [0, 1], ∀ci, cj ∈ [0, 1],
where a, b ∈ R++. The element θi is the private component of agent i’s signal, as it
is of interest to him only, while ci is the common component as it is relevant to all
agents. Using the notation presented in Section 2, we have sii = θ
i + aci and sij = c
i













> 0) for some sii and j 6= i. We can verify
that condition (2) is satisfied if and only if a ≥ b.17 This is actually a single-crossing
condition: the common component of an agent’s signal has a larger marginal effect
on his own valuation than on the valuations of the other agents.
3.2.2 Additivity
We now introduce the technical condition which, combined with Monotonicity,





























i ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ I .
(3)
Observe that this is an additivity requirement: it requires the sum of the minimum
be equal to the minimum of the sum. One immediate observation is that (3) is sat-
isfied trivially in Bayesian environments. In the presence of ambiguity, the former























= 1a . Given the change of variables,
agent i’s valuation can be rewritten as vi(sii, s
−i
i ) = s
i
i + b ∑j 6=i s
j












= b for all i ∈ I and j 6= i. Therefore, the first inequality in condition (2) is satisfied
if and only if a ≥ b. Following analogous arguments, we can show that the second inequality in
condition (2) is satisfied if and only if a ≥ b.
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in general is less than the latter due to hedging against ambiguity.18 However, we
show that this condition is actually satisfied under some natural specifications of






: S−i → R can be considered as an asset. Then condition (3) is






cannot hedge one another. There are two
circumstances, besides the subjective expected utility framework, in which such







correlated. This is because within maxmin models, no matter how the set of beliefs
is specified, combining perfectly correlated assets cannot hedge against ambiguity.
A sufficient condition for this case to arise is that the valuation functions are linear
in a sense to be made precise in Section 4.1. The other circumstance is known as
comonotonic additivity in the literature (e.g., see Schmeidler (1986)), which says
combining comonotonic, weaker than perfectly correlated, assets does not reduce
ambiguity if the set of beliefs has a particular shape. This case involves joint re-
strictions on valuation functions and beliefs which are specified in Section 4.2.
3.2.3 Sufficiency
The following lemma establishes the sufficiency result.
Lemma 3.2. Let p be an allocation rule that satisfies Monotonicity and (3). Then p is
implementable if and only if {F i}Ni=1 satisfies Minimal Ambiguity under p.
The necessity of Minimal Ambiguity is given by Lemma 3.1. We now demon-
strate why Monotonicity and the technical condition (3) together can guarantee
the sufficiency of Minimal Ambiguity. The proof follows similar steps of the proof
of Lemma 2 in Myerson (1981). To account for ambiguity aversion, we make two
modifications to the proof in Myerson (1981): the first is that we construct a spe-
cific transfer scheme that implements p; the second is that we make explicit use of
18This feature of maxmin preferences is captured by the uncertainty aversion axiom of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989).
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the technical condition (3), which is trivially satisfied in Myerson (1981). Define a
transfer scheme x f ull as follows:
xif ull(s
i, s−i) := Ri(si)− pi(si, s−i)vi(sii, s
−i
i ), ∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ I ,
where Ri : Si → R is called the reward function for agent i.19 Observe that the
transfer scheme x f ull is constructed so that if everyone reports truthfully, the ex
post utility of agent i who receives signal si is a constant function of the other
agents’ reports and equal to the reward Ri(si). Thus, agent i is fully insured against
ambiguity in the interim stage. Following Bose et al. (2006), who first introduced
this class of transfer schemes, x f ull is called a full insurance transfer scheme and
(p, x f ull) is a full insurance mechanism. We now construct a specific reward func-















where τii := mintii∈S
i
i
tii for every i ∈ I .
20 Let x f ull be the full insurance transfer
scheme associated with the reward functions Ri and let µi be the indirect utility
functions associated with (p, x f ull). Notice that µ
i(si) = Ri(si) by construction of
the transfer scheme x f ull. We are going to prove that (p, x f ull) is interim incentive
compatible. Fix i ∈ I and si, ti ∈ Si. To show µi(si) ≥ ui(ti, si), there are two cases
to consider. Suppose first that tii ≤ s
i
i. By Monotonicity and (3), we obtain



























19Although x f ull depends on the allocation rule p, we suppress this dependence for notational sim-
plicity. A similar comment applies to Ri and x f ull defined below.
20We show in Appendix A .3 that Ri is well defined.
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Changing the order of integration and using the definition of si(tii) yield
































Similarly, if tii > s
i
i, then












































The first inequality follows from Minimal Ambiguity; the second inequality fol-
lows from Monotonicity; the equality follows from (3). Combining the inequalities
above and the definition of si(tii), we can conclude that















The combination of (4) and (5) yields














i = ui(ti, si).
The equality follows from the construction of the transfer scheme x f ull. Since s
i
and ti were arbitrarily chosen, this shows that interim incentive compatibility is
satisfied.21
From the proof of Lemma 3.2, we can see that the role of condition (3) is to
guarantee that local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply global incentive
constraints in maxmin settings, which is the key to the Myersonian approach. A
combination of this condition and the maxmin preferences allows us to extract as
much as possible out of the fact that agents’ utilities are quasilinear in transfers.22
21There exist other transfer schemes that can implement p. Nevertheless, we can show that any
interim incentive compatible mechanism is payoff equivalent to a full insurance mechanism.
22Another commonly used model of ambiguity in the literature is the smooth ambiguity model of
Klibanoff et al. (2005). It is readily seen that if we adopt the the smooth ambiguity model, agents’
16
We end this section by remarking that Monotonicity is not necessary for an al-
location rule to be implementable in an environment with maxmin agents. For
example, in the extreme case of complete ambiguity, any allocation rule is imple-
mentable.
4 Sufficient Conditions
In this section, we provide two natural specifications of preferences under which
the technical condition (3) is satisfied.
4.1 Linear Valuation Functions
Say that agent i’s valuation vi is linear if there exist functions gi : Sii → R+ and
f i, hi : S−ii → R+ such that
vi(sii, s
−i
i ) = g
i(sii)h










Notice that this notion of “linearity”, which is also used by Carroll (2012) and
Archer and Kleinberg (2014), is very “permissive”. For example, additively or
multiplicatively separable valuation functions are linear in the sense of (6).23
Assumption 1 (Linearity). For every i ∈ I , agent i’s valuation function vi is linear
in the sense of (6).
We can show that under Linearity, any allocation rule satisfies (3). Then the
next result follows.
Theorem 4.1. Let p be an allocation rule that satisfies Monotonicity. Assume that Lin-
earity holds. Then p is implementable if and only if {F i}Ni=1 satisfies Minimal Ambiguity
under p.
utilities in general are not quasilinear in transfers; moreover, local incentive compatibility is typi-
cally violated. Thus, our results do not extend to the smooth ambiguity model.
23Agent i’s valuation function is additively separable if hi in (6) is a constant function; agent i’s
valuation function is multiplicatively separable if f i is a constant function.
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4.2 Nonlinear Valuation Functions
Linearity imposes a strong restriction on valuation functions so that the tech-
nical condition (3) is satisfied without restricting agents’ beliefs. Now we pursue
another route. Namely, we impose a weaker restriction on valuation functions but
combine it with a restriction on beliefs: each agent’s valuation function satisfies
a suitably defined increasing differences condition and each agent’s preferences
satisfy the comonotonic independence axiom of Schmeidler (1989). The increasing
differences condition is a familiar restriction on valuation functions in the mech-
anism design literature and the comonotonic independence axiom is a standard
assumption in the decision theoretic literature24. Other than the two restrictions
discussed above, the approach used in this section can only be applied to deter-
ministic allocation rules.25 We show that when the restrictions on beliefs and valu-
ation functions are imposed, (3) is satisfied by all the deterministic allocation rules.
We first introduce the assumption on valuation functions. The valuation func-




































Observe first that if vi is linear in the sense of (6), then vi has increasing differences.
Thus, increasing differences is a weaker restriction on valuation functions than lin-
earity. In addition, increasing differences is quite weak when N = 2. For exam-
ple, standard supermodular and submodular valuation functions satisfy increas-
ing differences. However, when N > 2, the standard notion of supermodularity or
submodularity is neither sufficient nor necessary for increasing differences.
24Maxmin preferences that satisfy the comonotonic independence axiom are the intersection of
maxmin and Choquet expected utility model.
25An allocation rule p is deterministic if pi(s) = 1 or 0 for all s ∈ S and i ∈ I .
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Assumption 2 (Increasing Differences). For every i ∈ I , agent i’s valuation func-
tion vi has increasing differences.
We next define the comonotonic independence axiom of Schmeidler (1989). Let
(Ω, Σ) be a measurable space. Two acts f , g : Ω → R are comonotonic if
(




≥ 0 ∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω.
Suppose that an agent’s set of priors is given by F . His preferences satisfy the
comonotonic independence axiom if for all pairwise comonotonic acts f , g, h :
Ω → R, we have minF∈F
∫
Ω










(g + h)dF. In words, this axiom says that if the agent prefers act f to act
g, then combining both acts with h will not reverse his preferences, provided that
f , g and h are pairwise comonotonic. Intuitively, this axiom requires that combin-
ing two comonotonic acts do not reduce ambiguity.
We now present the representation of preferences that satisfy the comonotonic
independence axiom. A capacity is a function ν : Σ → [0, 1] such that (i) ν(∅) = 0
and ν(Ω) = 1; (ii) ν(A) ≤ ν(B) whenever A ⊆ B. A capacity is convex if it also
satisfies
ν(A ∪ B) + ν(A ∩ B) ≥ ν(A) + ν(B) ∀A, B ∈ Σ.
The core of a capacity ν is
core(ν) := {π ∈ ∆(Ω)|π(A) ≥ ν(A), ∀A ∈ Σ}.
Schmeidler (1989) shows that ambiguity averse preferences that satisfy the comono-
tonic independence axiom can be represented by maxmin expected utility with
the agent’s set of priors being the core of a convex capacity.26 Thus, the desired
assumption can be stated as follows.
Assumption 3 (Comonotonic Independence). For every i ∈ I , agent i’s set of
beliefs F i is the core of a convex capacity.
26Shapley (1971) shows that the core of a convex capacity is not empty.
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The ε-contamination model introduced in Example 1 provides a natural class
of preferences where an agent’s set of beliefs is a core. For any Fi∗ ∈ ∆(S
−i) and
any ε ∈ [0, 1], it can be easily verified that Cε(Fi∗) is the core of the convex capacity
νF
i
∗(A) := (1 − ε)Fi∗(A) ∀A ∈ Σ \ {Ω} and ν
Fi∗(Ω) := 1.
Theorem 4.2. Let p be a deterministic allocation rule that satisfies Monotonicity. Assume
that Increasing Differences and Comonotonic Independence hold. Then p is implementable
if and only if {F i}Ni=1 satisfies Minimal Ambiguity under p.
5 Implementation of the Efficient Allocation Rule
We show in this section how Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 can be applied to the imple-
mentation of the efficient allocation rule. Notice that the efficient allocation rule is
uniquely defined and deterministic almost everywhere. From now on, we focus
exclusively on the efficient allocation rule, denoted by p∗, which resolves ties in a
deterministic way.
We first demonstrate that the collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete under p∗. We show
this by explicitly constructing si(sii) and s
















tij ∀j 6= i.













































j ) ≤ v
j(tij, s
−i










j , ∀j 6= i.















∀ti ∈ e(sii), ∀s
−i ∈ S−i.
That is, the collection {Si}Ni=1 is complete under p∗. Then the following result is an
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immediate consequence of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
Corollary 5.1. Assume that Linearity holds and the efficient allocation rule p∗ satisfies
Monotonicity. Then p∗ is implementable if and only if {F i}Ni=1 satisfies Minimal Ambigu-
ity under p∗. The same conclusion holds if Linearity is replaced by Increasing Differences
and Comonotonic Independence.
We now explain intuitively how the presence of ambiguity aversion facilitates
efficient implementation.27 The main idea is that ambiguity aversion weakens in-
terim incentive compatibility constraints under full insurance transfer schemes. To
see this, consider a full insurance transfer scheme that implements p∗. Recall that
under such a transfer scheme, the agent who is awarded the object pays his val-
uation conditional on all the reports and every agent receives a reward which is
solely a function of his report. Thus, irrespective of other agents’ reports, the ex
post utility of agent i who receives si is always equal to the reward Ri(si) as long
as everyone reports truthfully—agent i is fully insured against ambiguity. In con-
trast, if agent i misreports, his interim utility is evaluated according to a worst-case
















The first term is the reward made to agent i based on his report ti; the second term
is agent i’s expected gain or loss from being awarded the object. Specifically, if
agent i reports a signal that results in a lower valuation, that is, tii < s
i
i, then he
attains a gain if he is awarded the object. This is because he pays for the object at
a price lower than his true valuation. By ambiguity aversion, he assigns the lowest
probability of being awarded the object. Likewise, if tii > s
i
i, he suffers a loss if he
is awarded the object, because he pays more than his true valuation. In this case,
ambiguity aversion drives him to assign the highest probability of being awarded
27It should be noted that the same intuition applies to the implementation of all allocation rules. We
provide the intuition in terms of the efficient allocation rule to contrast with the impossibility result
of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
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the object. As a result, the presence of ambiguity aversion minimizes the potential
gain and maximizes the potential loss—the incentive to lie is thus diminished. The
final question is then how much ambiguity is needed to ensure interim incentive
compatibility. This is addressed by Minimal Ambiguity: it quantifies the minimal
amount of ambiguity that guarantees local incentive compatibility. Then, com-
bined with Linearity (or Increasing Differences and Comonotonic Independence)
and Monotonicity, this minimal amount of ambiguity also guarantees global in-
centive compatibility.28
5.1 Informational Size
A natural question to ask is under what conditions the efficient allocation rule
p∗ is implementable with an arbitrarily small amount of ambiguity. This section
addresses this question by linking the required amount of ambiguity perceived by
an agent to his informational size.
Our definition of informational size is a counterpart of the notion introduced
in McLean and Postlewaite (2004, 2015a,b): it measures the degree to which one
agent’s signal can affect the valuations of other agents. Formally, define the infor-














Recall that sij is agent i’s information affecting the valuation of agent j. Thus, in a
model with private values, the informational size of each agent is 0.
One final definition is required before stating the main result of this section.
For every ε ∈ (0, 1], we say that a set of probability measures F on (Ω, Σ) contains
an ε-ball if there exists G ∈ ∆(Ω) such that {F ∈ ∆(Ω)|d(F, G) ≤ ε} ⊆ F , where d
28We want to emphasize that our results depend on agents’ utilities being quasilinear in transfers.
Only then, the mechanism designer can use transfers as instruments to fully insure agents against
ambiguity under honest reporting but induce ambiguity otherwise.
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is the Prokhorov metric.29
Theorem 5.1. Assume that Linearity holds and the efficient allocation rule p∗ satisfies
Monotonicity. For every ε ∈ (0, 1], if each agent i’s set of beliefs F i contains an ε-ball,
then there exists a δ > 0 such that if γi < δ for every i ∈ I , the efficient allocation
rule p∗ is implementable. The same conclusion holds if Linearity is replaced by Increasing
Differences and Comonotonic Independence.











bounded almost everywhere, Monotonicity is automatically satisfied if the infor-
mational size of each agent is sufficiently small.
Informational smallness arises naturally when the number of agents is large.
Intuitively, a single agent’s private information would have a small effect on other
agents’ valuations in the presence of many agents. We can show that if the in-
formational size of each agent converges to zero as the number of agents grows,
then given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, the efficient allocation rule is im-
plementable as long as the number of agents is sufficiently large. The proof is
essentially identical to that of Theorem 5.1.
6 An Example
In this section, we first present a simple example to illustrate the main insight
for our results. In particular, it exhibits the conflict between Bayesian incentive
compatibility and efficiency, and indicates how a certain amount of ambiguity can
resolve this conflict. We further demonstrate that if the informational size of each
agent converges to zero in a sequence of environments with an increasing number
of agents, then the minimal amount of ambiguity that induces truth telling also
converges to zero as the number of agents increases.
29We use Prokhorov metric to measure the distance between probability measures and the definition
is provided in Appendix C .
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N − 1 ∑
j 6=i
cj ∀θi ∈ [0, 1], ∀cj ∈ [0, 1],
where sii = θ
i ∈ [0, 1] and sij = c
i ∈ [0, 1] for all j 6= i. Let θ−i := ×j 6=iθ
j and c−i :=
×j 6=ic
j. One readily sees that the efficient allocation is determined by θi − 1N−1 c
i.
Fix i and take (θ̃i, c̃i) and (θ̂i, ĉi) such that
θ̃i > θ̂i and θ̃i −
1
N − 1




Intuitively, (7) implies that the common component swamps agent i’s idiosyncratic
value. Since θ̃i − 1N−1 c̃
i
< θ̂i − 1N−1 ĉ
i, efficiency requires that agent i have a higher
chance of obtaining the object by reporting (θ̂i, ĉi) than (θ̃i, c̃i) under any belief Fi
with full support, that is,
∫
pi∗(θ̂
i, ĉi, θ−i, c−i)dFi >
∫
pi∗(θ̃
i, c̃i, θ−i, c−i)dFi. (8)









i, c̃i, θ−i, c−i)dFi. (9)
Observe that in a Bayesian framework, the inequality in (9) contradicts (8), show-
ing that efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms do not exist. The basic
intuition behind this impossibility result is that incentive compatibility requires
agent i’s probability of obtaining the object to increase in his private component θi;
efficiency requires this probability to increase only in θi − 1N−1 c
i. Therefore, agent
i’s private incentives are not aligned with social optimality. However, if agent i
perceives a nontrivial amount of ambiguity and is ambiguity averse, the require-
ment of incentive compatibility becomes weaker. When he is sufficiently ambigu-
ity averse so that the inequality in (9) is satisfied, there is no conflict between agent
i’s personal incentives and social optimality.
Next we show heuristically that the necessary amount of ambiguity for efficient
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implementation converges to zero as N increases. By incentive compatibility, the
inequality in (9) must hold for all pairs of signals (θ̃i, c̃i) and (θ̂i, ĉi) satisfying (7).













i, ci, θ−i, c−i)dFi ∀θi ∈ [0, 1],
















cj ≤ θi −
1
N − 1
}) ∀θi ∈ [0, 1].
(10)
The inequality in (10) imposes a minimum requirement on the size of F i, which
can be interpreted as the required amount of ambiguity for efficient implementa-
tion.30 Observe that as N → ∞, this required amount of ambiguity goes to zero.
It is straightforward to verify that (10) is the Minimal Ambiguity condition in this
example. Since the valuation functions are linear and moreover, the efficient allo-
cation rule satisfies Monotonicity as is shown in Example 3, our sufficiency result
Theorem 4.1 applies: given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, the efficient allo-
cation rule is implementable if the number of agents is sufficiently large.
7 Discussion and Related Literature
Independence assumption. We assume that each agent’s set of beliefs does
not depend on the realization of his signal, which is an analogue of the “indepen-
dence of signals” assumption from Bayesian settings. In the literature on efficient
mechanism design, a correlated information condition proposed by Cremer and
30To see this, suppose that all agents’ signals are identically and independently distributed. Let
F̂i be a cumulative density function of θ j − 1N−1 c
j for all j 6= i. Suppose that agent i’s set of
beliefs about θ j − 1N−1 c






McLean (1985, 1988) is used extensively to bypass the impossibility result.31 They
show that efficient implementation is possible if the conditional distribution on
other agents’ signals varies with the realized signal of an agent exogenously; our
model suggests that even if there is no a priori heterogeneity among beliefs given
different realized signals, such heterogeneity can emerge endogenously due to am-
biguity aversion. More importantly, the belief used to evaluate a misreport is the
one that makes this misreport the least profitable. Furthermore, the efficient mech-
anism from Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988) relies on the construction of lotteries
whereas our full insurance mechanism does not.
If an agent’s set of beliefs can depend on his type, an immediate consequence
of Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988) is that ambiguity is not necessary for efficient
implementation. Our necessity result hence fails in settings with correlated infor-
mation.
Yet we are able to extend our sufficiency result to a special case of correlated
information, namely affiliation. We can generalize the Minimal Ambiguity con-
dition and full insurance transfer schemes to a setting with affiliated signals, and
show that under some standard conditions, Minimal Ambiguity is still sufficient
for efficient implementation. Details are provided in Appendix D . Notice that a
straightforward application of the lottery mechanism from Cremer and McLean
(1985, 1988) has its limitations in maxmin settings (e.g., see Renou (2015)): when
agents are ambiguity averse, the belief used to evaluate a lottery is endogenously
determined and, hence, it is difficult to construct a lottery for each type with the
desired property.
Common knowledge assumption. In Section 2, we assume that each agent’s
set of beliefs is common knowledge. However, all our results continue to hold
under a weaker condition: it is common knowledge that each agent’s set of beliefs
31Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988) assume finite signal space. McAfee and Reny (1992) and Miller
et al. (2007) extend their results to allow for infinite signal space.
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contains a certain set.32 Formally, we assume it is common knowledge that a set
of probability measures F i∗ ⊆ ∆(S
−i) is contained in agent i’s set of beliefs for
all i ∈ I .33 This common knowledge condition is clearly weaker than the one
in Section 2. Furthermore, if we replace F i with F i∗ in the definition of Minimal
Ambiguity, the conclusions of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 will continue to hold.34 Also,
Theorem 5.1 can be strengthened: as long as it is common knowledge that for
every i ∈ I , there exists Gi ∈ ∆(S−i) such that agent i’s set of beliefs contains an
ε-ball around Gi, the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 continues to hold. Notice that this
statement does not require the mechanism designer to acquire full knowledge of
each agent’s beliefs.
Efficiency. There are three notions of efficiency for settings with incomplete
information: ex ante efficiency, interim efficiency, and ex post efficiency. In a
Bayesian setting with quasilinear utilities, if all agents and the mechanism designer
share the same ex ante belief, the three notions coincide.35 However, they gener-
ally differ in a setting with maxmin agents. The notion we use in this paper is ex
post efficiency, which is not affected by the presence of ambiguity aversion. In Ap-
pendix E , we show that our results remain valid if we adopt the notion of interim
efficiency. However, there exist situations in which ex ante efficiency cannot be
attained.
Mechanism design with maxmin preferences. Bose et al. (2006), Bodoh-Creed
(2012), and Carroll (2017) study revenue maximization with maxmin agents.36 By
32I am very grateful to Pietro Ortoleva for suggesting this weakening of the common knowledge
assumption.
33Since the closed convex hull of a set of beliefs and that set generate the identical preference, an
equivalent assumption is that it is common knowledge that F i∗ is contained in the closed convex
hull of agent i’s set of beliefs for all i ∈ I .
34To see why, consider a full insurance transfer scheme that implements the allocation rule if each
agent i’s set of beliefs were F i∗. Suppose now that agent i becomes more ambiguity averse, that
is, his true set of beliefs contains F i∗. His interim utility when he reports truthfully remains the
same, but his interim utility when he misreports is lower under a larger set of beliefs. Since truthful
revelation is optimal when agent i’s set of beliefs were F i∗, it remains optimal when agent i is in fact
more ambiguity averse.
35See Laffont (1985).
36Lopomo et al. (2014) study mechanism design problems where agents have incomplete prefer-
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comparison, our paper focuses on efficient implementation. Also, those papers
adopt a setting with private valuations, whereas we focus on a setting with inter-
dependent valuations. Bose and Daripa (2009) show that a descending auction can
extract almost all surplus. However, their approach does not extend to settings
with interdependent valuations and multidimensional signals. In our setting, full
surplus extraction is impossible except in the case of complete ambiguity.
Wolitzky (2016) studies the bilateral trade problem of Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) with each agent’s set of priors taking a particular form. In contrast, we
fix an object allocation problem and identify the minimal requirement on agents’
sets of priors for efficient implementation. Moreover, we focus on efficient mecha-
nisms without imposing balanced budget constraint.37
Bose and Renou (2014) study situations in which the mechanism designer can
create ambiguity deliberately through an ambiguous communication device.38 Con-
sequently, the allocation rules that are not implementable with respect to the priors
become implementable. Our paper complements their paper in the sense that we
show precisely how much ambiguity is sufficient for implementing an efficient
allocation rule and their result suggests that this amount of ambiguity can be gen-
erated through an ambiguous communication device. We provide an example in
Appendix F to illustrate how to generate the required amount of ambiguity for
efficient implementation through an ambiguous communication device.
Mechanism design with approximate implementation. McLean and Postle-
waite (2015b) show that a generalized VCG mechanism39 is approximately incen-
tive compatible if agents are informationally small. Roughly speaking, a mecha-
ences as in Bewley (2002).
37If the mechanism designer employs a full insurance mechanism, there exist realizations of types
such that the mechanism designer runs a deficit ex post. However, whether the mechanism de-
signer can achieve an ex ante surplus depends crucially on his ex ante beliefs. Generally speaking,
if the agents face more ambiguity than the mechanism designer, then the mechanism designer can
generate positive revenue ex ante.
38Di Tillio et al. (2016) and Guo (2017) study the effects of introducing ambiguity in mechanisms.
39See Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) and Vickrey (1961).
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nism is approximately incentive compatible if an agent would not misreport when
there is a small utility gain. The literature does not provide an explicit reason why
an agent would forgo a small utility gain. Alternatively, we adopt a different class
of transfer schemes, full insurance transfer schemes, and show that the realization
of weaker interim incentive compatibility constraints arises endogenously as a re-
sult of ambiguity aversion. We should point out that our result is not an immediate
extension of the result of McLean and Postlewaite (2015b). This is because the gen-
eralized VCG mechanism fails to take into account the ambiguity aversion of the
agents and, hence, is not incentive compatible except in the case of complete ambi-
guity, regardless of the informational size of the agents. In contrast, full insurance
mechanisms exploit the ambiguity aversion of agents so as to create correct incen-
tives for the agents. Even in a Bayesian environment with private values, the full
insurance mechanism does not reduce to the standard VCG mechanism.
Appendix
A Appendix for Section 3
A .1 Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma A 1. Suppose that the allocation rule p is implementable with associated indirect
utility functions {µi}Ni=1. For every i ∈ I and s


































Proof. By definition, for every i ∈ I and si, ti ∈ Si,


























Thus, the interim incentive compatibility constraint µi(si) ≥ ui(ti, si) implies














Reversing the roles of si and ti, we obtain














The desired inequalities in (A1) follow by combining (A2) and (A3).





i ) = v
i(tii, s
−i





i(si) = µi(ti) is
an immediate consequence of (A1).





























i , the Mean Value Theorem allows


















i is continuously differentiable, the compactness of the signal spaces





| < M for all ŝii and s
−i
i .
Lemma A 3. If the allocation rule p is implementable, the associated indirect utility
function µi is Lipschitz continuous on Sii for every i ∈ I .
Proof. Fix i ∈ I . Lemmas A 1 and A 2 imply that there exists M > 0 such that for
every si, ti ∈ Si with µi(si)− µi(ti) ≥ 0, we have













dFi ≤ M|sii − t
i
i|.
Similarly, for every si, ti ∈ Si with µi(si)− µi(ti) ≤ 0, we have













dFi ≤ M|sii − t
i
i|.
Combining the two inequalities above, we can conclude that µi is Lipschitz contin-
uous.
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Lemma A 4. For every i ∈ I , every ri ∈ Si, every sii ∈ S
i
i, and every F


























Proof. Fix i ∈ I , ri ∈ Si, sii ∈ S
i
i, and F
i ∈ F i. For every tii ∈ S
i
i, the Mean Value















for some ŝii between s
i
i and










































































Proof. 40Fix i ∈ I , ri ∈ Si, and sii ∈ S
i
i. It follows from Lemma A 4 that for all












































































































40This proof follows similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2 in Bose et al. (2006).
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Such Fi(tii) exists as F
i is weak∗ compact. By passing to a subsequence, Fi(tii)

























































































continuous and uniformly bounded; from Lemma A 4, the second term approaches



















































































The previous inequality together with (A4) completes the proof.
A .2 Proof of Lemma 3.1




lies in the specified interval. Fix i ∈ I and si ∈ Si. For every ŝi ∈ e(sii)
and every ti /∈ e(sii), Lemma A 1 implies














For every ŝi ∈ e(sii), Lemma A 1 implies µ
i(si) = µi(ŝi). Thus,















If tii > s
i




















By Lemma A 3, µi is differentiable a.e. in Sii. Thus, if µ
i is differentiable at sii, then
taking the lower limit as tii ↓ s
i




























Similarly, if tii < s
i





















































A .3 Appendix for Section 3.2









tii. Let {a0, ..., an} be a partition of S
i
i, that is, τ
i
i = a0 < ... < an = τ̂
i
i . Given
a partition {a0, ..., an}, let |P| := maxk∈{1,...,n} ak − ak−1 and let
mk(s
−i



























dFi is Riemann integrable on Sii.
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∀k = 1, .., n, ∀s−ii ∈ S
−i
i . (A7)
Also, Monotonicity implies that for every k = 1, ..., n, every ŝii ∈ [ak−1, ak], and










































































































































































The second inequality follows from the definition of M and the inequality in (A7);
the last inequality follows from the choice of n. By Theorem 11.30 in Aliprantis and











dFi is Riemann integrable.














, where Mk := supy∈[ak−1,ak ] f (y). Relevant concepts and results on Riemann integral can be
found in Section 11.7 in Aliprantis and Border (2006).
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B Appendix for Section 4
To prove Theorem 4.1, our first step is to show that under Linearity, any alloca-








































i ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ I .
(B8)
The next step is then to show that the condition above further implies (3). Then
applying Lemma 3.2 completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma B 7. Assume Linearity. Then any allocation rule p satisfies (B8).
Proof. Fix i ∈ I , rii, t
i
i ∈ S



















Plugging (B9) into (B8) establishes the desired equality.
Lemma B 8. Let p be an allocation rule that satisfies (B8). Then p satisfies (3).










that contains n intervals with equal length. Then, using the definition of Riemann

























































Applying similar proofs to Lemma A 5 and the definition of Riemann integral, the



























The proof of Theorem 4.2 follows analogous steps: we first show that under
Comonotonic Independence and Increasing Differences, any deterministic alloca-
tion rule p satisfies (B8). Then applying Lemmas B 8 and 3.2 completes the proof.








































for all tii ∈ S
i
i. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that










. If tii > s
i
i, there exists l > 0 such that






i(tii − l, s
−i




i(tii − l, ŝ
−i
i ),
which is equivalent to
vi(tii − l, ŝ
−i
i )− v
i(tii − l, s
−i





































Dividing both sides by ŝii − s
i










































, a contradiction. The case in which tii < s
i
i can be handled
analogously.
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Lemma B 10. Assume Comonotonic Independence and Increasing Differences. Then any
deterministic allocation rule p satisfies (B8).












are comonotonic functions. Since p is deterministic,






are comonotonic as well. Combining
this observation with Comonotonic Independence, Theorem and Proposition 3 in
Schmeidler (1986) together imply the equality in (B8).
C Appendix for Section 5
For any two probability measures F, G ∈ ∆(Ω), the Prokhorov metric is
d(F, G) := inf{ε > 0|F(A) ≤ G(Aε) + ε, ∀A ∈ Σ},
where Aε := {ω ∈ Ω| infω′∈A d∞(ω, ω










tij for every i ∈ I , j 6= i,
and sii ∈ S
i
i.








































Suppose that γi < δ for every i ∈ I . By construction, for every i ∈ I , sii ∈ S
i
i, and



































































. By assumption, η > 0. For every i ∈ I and
si ∈ Si, define
Asi := {s
−i ∈ S−i|vi(sii, s
−i












−i ∈ S−i|vi(sii, s
−i





























, we have Asi ⊆ Bsi .
Lemma C 12. For every ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that if γi < δ for every i ∈ I ,
we have Bsi ⊆ A
ε
si
for all i ∈ I and si ∈ Si.
Proof. Take ε > 0. By Lemma C 11, there exists a δ > 0 such that if γi < δ for every





















− ηε ∀i ∈ I , sii ∈ S
i
i, s
−i ∈ S−i. (C10)
Assume γi < δ for every i ∈ I . Fix i ∈ I and si ∈ Si. Since Asi ⊆ Bsi , we only
need to show that infŝ−i∈A
si
d∞(s−i, ŝ−i) ≤ ε for every s−i ∈ Bsi \ Asi . Take any










k ∀j 6= i, ∀k 6= j.
By construction, d∞(s−i, ŝ−i) = ε. We are going to show that ŝ−i ∈ Asi .
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. By construction, vi(sii, ŝ
−i















































































≥ ηε − ηε = 0.
The first inequality follows from s−i ∈ Bsi ; the second inequality follows from









k, ∀j 6= i, ∀k 6= j, ∀s
−i ∈ Bsi \ Asi} and A+ := Asi ∪ D. Extend agent i’s beliefs to this
larger domain S−i ∪ D such that Fi(D) = 0 for all Fi ∈ F i. Lemma C 12 then becomes Bsi ⊆ A
ε
+
and the proof of Theorem 5.1 remains valid.
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(C10); the last inequality follows from the construction of ŝll and the definition of
η.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Take ε > 0. Assume that each agent i’s set of beliefs F i con-
tains an ε-ball. By Lemma C 12, there exists a δ > 0 such that if γi < δ for every
i ∈ I , Bsi ⊆ A
ε
si
for all i ∈ I and si ∈ Si. Assume that γi < δ for every i ∈ I . Fix































































That is, Minimal Ambiguity is satisfied. Applying Corollary 5.1 completes the
proof.
D Affiliated signals
In this section, we show that our result can be generalized to environments with
some correlation of signals. In particular, we consider a special form of correlation:
the variables s11, ..., s
N




k are independently distributed for
all i, j, k ∈ I and j 6= k.43 Let F be the set of prior distributions of s1, ..., sN and for
each F ∈ F , let Fi(sii) be the distribution of s
−i conditional on sii that is consistent
with F. We use F i(sii) to denote agent i’s set of beliefs about other agents’ signals
conditional his realized signal si ∈ e(sii).
We next generalize Minimal Ambiguity to this setting.
Definition 4. For every i ∈ I and every sii ∈ S
i
i, the set F
i(sii) satisfies Minimal
43Suppose the random variables Z1, ..., ZN have joint density F. Then the random variables are
affiliated if and only if F(z ∨ ẑ)F(z ∧ ẑ) ≥ F(z)F(ẑ) for all z, ẑ ∈ RN , where z ∨ ẑ denotes the
component-wise maximum of z and ẑ, and z ∧ ẑ denotes the component-wise minimum.
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Proposition D 1. Assume that Linearity holds. Then p∗ is implementable if for every
i ∈ I and every sii ∈ S
i
i, the set F
i(sii) satisfies Minimal Ambiguity under p∗.
Proof. For every i ∈ I , Linearity implies that there exist functions gi : Sii → R+
and f i, hi : S−ii → R+ such that
vi(sii, s
−i
i ) = g
i(sii)h










Define a transfer scheme x f ull as follows:
xif ull(s
i, s−i) := Ri(si)− pi∗(s
i, s−i)vi(sii, s
−i



















Let µi be the indirect utility functions associated with (p∗, x f ull). Notice that µ
i(si) =
Ri(si) by construction of the transfer scheme x f ull. We are going to prove that
(p∗, x f ull) is interim incentive compatible. Fix i ∈ I and s
i, ti ∈ Si. To show
µi(si) ≥ ui(ti, si), there are two cases to consider. Suppose that tii ≤ s
i
i. By the
assumption that sii and s
i
j are independently distributed for all j 6= i, the efficient
allocation rule p∗ satisfies Monotonicity as is shown in Example 3. Therefore,








































conditional distribution function of s−i that is consistent of Hŝii


















































The first equality follows from the definition of Hi(ŝii); the first inequality follows
from the observation that pi∗(s
i(tii), s
−i) decreases in s
j
j for all j 6= i, the assumption
that sii and s
j





dently distributed for all j 6= i, and Theorem 5.4.5 in Milgrom (2004). Combining
the inequalities above and the inequalities in (D11), we obtain


















































where the second inequality follows from the definition of si(tii) and the last equal-
ity follows from the construction of the transfer scheme x f ull. The proof for the case
in which tii > s
i
i follows from analogous arguments. Since s
i and ti were arbitrarily
chosen, this shows that interim incentive compatibility is satisfied.
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E Ex ante, Interim, and Ex post Efficient Mechanisms
This section formalizes different notions of efficiency and illustrate their rela-
tionships in our setting. For any signal s ∈ S, we assume that the mechanism
designer’s ex post utility is −∑i x
i(s), where xi(s) is the transfer to agent i. The
mechanism designer’s ex ante preferences are represented by maxmin expected
utility where GMi denotes his set of ex ante beliefs about agent i’s signals. Further,
we assume that the mechanism designer believes that all the signals are indepen-






i } denotes his set of ex ante beliefs






j }. In the ex ante
stage, agents have not observed their signals. Each agent’s ex ante preference is
represented by maxmin expected utility with G i being the set of ex ante beliefs of
agent i. In the interim stage, each agent has observed his own signal, but not the
signals of the others. Recall that F i denotes the set of interim beliefs of agent i.
Finally, in the ex post stage, all the signals are publicly revealed.
A mechanism (p, x) is ex ante efficient if there is no other mechanism ( p̂, x̂) that
yields a higher ex ante utility to some agent or the mechanism designer, without
lowering the ex ante utilities of the others. Interim and ex post efficient mecha-
nisms can be defined analogously. Let EA, EI , and EP denote the sets of mecha-
nisms that are respectively ex ante, interim, and ex post efficient.
In a Bayesian setting with quasilinear utilities, if all agents and the mechanism
designer share the same ex ante belief, the three notions coincide: EA = EI = EP =
{(p, x)|p ∈ P∗}, where P∗ := {p|pi(s) > 0 ⇒ i ∈ argmaxj v
j(s1j , ..., s
N
j ), ∀s ∈ S}.
In our setting, the three notions generally differ. Obviously, the set of ex post ef-
ficient mechanisms remains the same. We now examine how the sets of ex ante
and interim efficient mechanisms are affected by the presence of ambiguity aver-
sion. Define a transfer scheme xC as follows: x
i
C(s) := A
i − pi(s)vi(s1i , ..., s
N
i ) for
all s ∈ S, all i ∈ I , where Ai ∈ R. Each agent is fully insured against ambiguity in
the ex ante stage under xC. Denote the set of all such transfer schemes by XC and
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denote the set of all full insurance transfer schemes by X f ull.
Proposition E 2. If GM ⊆ G i for all i ∈ I , then {(p, xC)|p ∈ P∗, xC ∈ XC} ⊆ EA;If
GM−i ⊆ F
i for all i ∈ I , then {(p, x f ull)|p ∈ P∗, x f ull ∈ X f ull} ⊆ EI .
The proof of Proposition E 2 follows similar lines as that of Proposition 1 in
Bose et al. (2006). The intuition is simple: if the mechanism designer faces less
ambiguity than the agents, he can improve social welfare by fully insuring the
agents.
An implication of Proposition E 2 is that the full insurance mechanisms we
construct are interim efficient. Thus, our results will remain the same if we use the
notion of interim efficiency. However, ex ante efficient and interim incentive com-
patible mechanisms may not exist—there exist situations in which {(p, xC)|p ∈
P∗, xC ∈ XC} = EA.
44 Since each agent’s indirect utility is independent of the
realization of his signal under xC, ex ante efficient mechanisms are not interim
incentive compatible except in the case of complete ambiguity.
F Ambiguous Communication Devices
The central idea of Bose and Renou (2014) is that the mechanism designer can
create ambiguity through an ambiguous communication device. To illustrate how
the use of such device can facilitate efficient implementation, we explicitly con-
struct one using the example from Section 6. We assume that there is no prior
ambiguity, that is, each agent has a single prior over the other agents’ types. We
also assume that agents adopt full Bayesian updating. For simplicity, let N = 2 and
let agent i’s prior distribution of θ j − cj be uniform on [−1, 1] for every i ∈ {1, 2}
and j 6= i. The ambiguous communication device is constructed as follows: Before
the standard allocation mechanism is carried out, each agent i can send a mes-
sage (θ̃i, c̃i) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] to the mechanism designer and can receive message a
44For example, as shown in Proposition 3 in Bose et al. (2006), this is the case when the mechanism
designer has a single ex ante belief FM ∈ ∆(S) with full support and there exists ε ∈ (0, 1) such that
Cε(FM) ⊆ G i for every i ∈ I .
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or b from the mechanism designer. All messages are confidential. The messages
sent to agents are drawn according to one of the two probability systems ϕ and
ϕ̂: Denote ϕi(mi|θ̃ j, c̃j) the probability that the mechanism designer sends message
mi ∈ {a, b} to agent i conditional on receiving the message (θ̃ j, c̃j) from agent j 6= i
and let ϕ
(
(m1, m2)|(θ̃1, c̃1), (θ̃2, c̃2)
)
:= ϕ1(m1|θ̃2, c̃2)ϕ2(m2|θ̃1, c̃1) for all (m1, m2),
(θ̃1, c̃1), and (θ̃2, c̃2). Similarly, we can define the other probability system ϕ̂. For
every i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i, let




1 if θ̃ j − c̃j ∈ [−1, 0],
0 otherwise;




0 if θ̃ j − c̃j ∈ [−1, 0],
1 otherwise.
Since agents are ambiguous about the probability system that has been used by the
mechanism designer, they perceive ambiguity after one round of communication.
The mechanism designer uses the following two-stage mechanism to imple-
ment the efficient allocation rule p∗. In the first stage, agents communicate with the
mechanism designer through the ambiguous communication device constructed
above. In the second stage, agents report their signals and the mechanism de-
signer carries out the mechanism (p∗, x f ull), where x f ull is constructed according
to posterior beliefs. We can verify that each agent i reporting (θi, ci) truthfully in
both stages is an equilibrium. Thus, the efficient allocation rule is indeed imple-
mentable.
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